Document that asks us supreme court to exercise jurisdiction over

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

“Personal jurisdiction” or in personam jurisdiction refers to a court’s power over a person (or entity) who is a party to, or involved in, a case or controversy before the court, including its power to render judgments affecting that person’s rights.1 Footnote
Personal Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014 ). Prior to the states’ ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff , a nonresident who received an adverse judgment from one state court would often wait until the winning party sought to obtain enforcement of the judgment2 Footnote
In this context, “enforcement” of a judgment referred to a court’s action “to compel a person to comply with the terms of a judgment” of another state’s courts after determining that the foreign state’s judgment should be recognized as a judgment of the domestic court. Enforcement, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . in the nonresident’s state before challenging the issuing court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident.3 Footnote
Stephen E. Sachs , Pennoyer Was Right , 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 , 1270 (2017) ( “States that wanted to exercise broad jurisdiction would do so, and would execute judgments within their borders on as much of the defendant’s property as they could find. These state judgments, unlike foreign ones, could claim the benefit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 1790 Act. But these provisions were read to leave the law of personal jurisdiction alone. So when American courts were presented with the judgment of another tribunal, whether from Michigan or Mexico, they used the same approach to determining personal jurisdiction. The judgment was the product of a separate sovereign, which was expected to comply with international rules.” ). State (and, in some cases, federal)4 Footnote
Id. at 1279 (noting that “federal courts did hear actions involving the recognition of other courts’ judgments, giving them opportunities to comment on the general rules” in diversity cases or cases raising questions under federal statutes regulating judicial procedure). See, e.g., Flower v. Parker , 9 F. Cas. 323, 324 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) ( No. 4891) (Story, C.J.) (evaluating a Massachusetts state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Louisiana defendant in a Massachusetts federal court case seeking the enforcement of the state court’s judgment). A “diversity case” is one in which a federal court exercises “authority over a case involving parties who are citizens of different states and an amount in controversy greater than a statutory minimum.” Diversity Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . courts considering whether such judgments were enforceable would typically resolve such jurisdictional challenges on the basis of general, customary law principles5 Footnote
“Customary law” refers to law “consisting of customs that are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.” Customary Law, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . that had been shaped by the rules for recognition of foreign judgments under international law.6 Footnote
Sachs, supra note 3, at 1270 ( “The Constitution’s role here was largely indirect—letting defendants remove their cases into federal court or challenge enforcement through diversity suits.” ). See also Hall v. Williams , 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232, 238 (1828) (stating that the “principles of the common law” applicable “to judgments of the tribunals of foreign countries” also applied “to the judgments of the courts of the several States when sought to be enforced by the judiciary power of any State other than that in which they were rendered” ).

However, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer , the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment7 Footnote
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ). to limit the power of state courts to render judgments affecting the personal rights of defendants8 Footnote
Although the bulk of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerns the constitutionality of courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants, the Court has addressed personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in at least one case. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (upholding a Kansas trial court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident class-action plaintiffs based on the mailing of an “opt-out notice” to the plaintiffs even though their contacts with the forum might not have been sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process had they been defendants in a lawsuit). who do not reside within the state’s territory.9 Footnote
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ( “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.” ) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ). “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” Id. As discussed elsewhere in the Constitution Annotated, see supra Amdt5.4.5.4.7 Other Aspects of Due Process, the Due Process Clause also requires that a defendant receive adequate notice that a lawsuit has been brought against him and have the opportunity to respond. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950) ( “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” ). In addition to complying with the requirements of the Federal Constitution, state courts must also have authority under state law in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Oftentimes, states have enacted “long-arm” statutes that grant their courts jurisdiction over nonresidents. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 ( “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” ); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (specifying situations in which the exercise of jurisdiction comports with state law). Pennoyer converted the issue of personal jurisdiction into a question of federal constitutional law, allowing a party to obtain direct review of a state court’s judgment in federal court (i.e., review of the judgment on appeal) on the grounds that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over the party.10 Footnote
Sachs, supra note 3, at 1253 ( “The Fourteenth Amendment remade this picture simply by changing the route for appeal. A judgment without jurisdiction was void; its execution took away property (or, less commonly, liberty) without due process of law. That turned the presence or absence of jurisdiction, full stop, into a matter of constitutional concern.” ). “Execution” of a judgment refers to judicial enforcement of a money judgment, often “by seizing and selling the judgment debtor’s property.” Execution, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state court that issued a judgment affecting a nonresident without jurisdiction had violated the constitutional rights of that person by depriving them of property without due process of law.11 Footnote
Sachs, supra note 3, at 1253. “Due process” generally refers to the “conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” Due Process, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 .

Over the years, the Supreme Court has offered three main justifications for the constitutional constraints on a court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations. First, each state’s status as a “co-equal sovereign” in a federal system of government implies at least some limits on the power of its courts to render judgments affecting the rights of entities outside of that state’s boundaries.12 Footnote
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court , No. 16-466, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 19, 2017) ( “As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’” ) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ); World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum “acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system” ); id. at 293 ( “The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.” ). Second, constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction attempt to address concerns about the unfairness of subjecting defendants to litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum.13 Footnote
World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum “protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum” ); Hanson , 357 U.S. at 251 (acknowledging that limits on personal jurisdiction are, in part, “a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation” ). The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of personal jurisdiction makes it easier for defendants to structure their conduct in a manner that will avoid subjecting them to lawsuits in a particular forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) . Finally, constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction recognize that the Due Process Clause protects defendants from being deprived of life, liberty, or property by a tribunal without lawful power.14 Footnote
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011) (plurality opinion) ( “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful power. This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.” ) (internal citations omitted); Burger King , 471 U.S. at 471–72 ( “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) (declaring that the restriction on state power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is “ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause” ).

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing the doctrine of personal jurisdiction as applied in state courts spans a period of American history that has witnessed a significant expansion of interstate and global commerce, as well as major technological advancements in transportation and communication.15 Footnote
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) ( “As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome.” ). These changes produced a fundamental shift in the Court’s views concerning the doctrine.16 Footnote
Id. Although the Court initially considered the defendant’s physical presence within the forum state to be the touchstone of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him or her,17 Footnote
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ( “The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum . . . [an] illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.” ), overruled in part by, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) . it later rejected strict adherence to this rule in favor of a more flexible standard that examines a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state to determine whether those contacts make it reasonable to require him to respond to a lawsuit there.18 Footnote
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ( “[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” ).

The Supreme Court’s opinions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and subsequent cases have established a two-part test for determining when a state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over each nonresident defendant sued by a plaintiff comports with due process: (1) the defendant must have established minimum contacts with the forum state that demonstrate an intent to avail itself of the benefits and protections of state law; and (2) it must be reasonable to require the defendant to defend the lawsuit in the forum.19 Footnote
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ( “[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist ‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum State.” ) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316 ); id. at 292 ( “[T]he defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316) ). See also Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 ( “So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” ). Since that fundamental shift, much of the Court’s jurisprudence addressing the limits that the Constitution places on state courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction has addressed the quality and nature of the “minimum contacts” among the defendant, the forum, and litigation that the Constitution requires before a court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.20 Footnote
See discussion infra Amdt5.4.7.1.4 Minimum Contact Requirements for Personal Jurisdiction. Questions over personal jurisdiction have become one of the most frequent constitutional issues resolved by lower federal courts,21 Footnote
See Edward A. Hartnett , Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts , 59 SMU L. Rev. 1735 , 1755 (2006) (describing the “constitutionality of exercising personal jurisdiction” as “probably the most common constitutional question that courts decide” ). and are the basis for a dismissal of complaints in a considerable number of cases lodged in both federal and state court.22 Footnote
See Michael E. Solimine , The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction , 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1 , 23–38 (1998) (noting in a study of nearly 1,000 cases addressing the issue personal jurisdiction decided by state supreme courts and federal appeals courts between and 1970 and 1994, including 148 products liability cases, that personal jurisdiction was a successful defense in nearly 41% of the cases in which the defense was raised).

When determining whether a defendant has minimum contacts with the court in which the action is initially filed, the Court has distinguished the types of contacts sufficient for a court’s exercise of “general” personal jurisdiction over the defendant from those contacts sufficient for its exercise, alternatively, of “specific” jurisdiction. A court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction may be constitutional when the defendant has contacts with the forum that give rise to, or are related to, the plaintiff’s cause of action (e.g., an act or occurrence caused by the defendant that takes place in the forum or has an impact there).23 Footnote
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) ( “It has been said that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” ) (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman , Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis , 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 , 1144–64 (1966) ); Int’l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 317 ( “Presence in the state . . . has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on . . . .” ) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, a court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for any claim—even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different state—may be constitutional when the defendant’s activities in the forum state are so substantial that it is reasonable to require it to defend a lawsuit that did not arise out of its activities in the forum state and is unrelated to those activities.24 Footnote
See Helicopteros , 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 ( “When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” ); see also id. at 416 (holding that a Texas court could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that did not have a place of business in Texas and had only limited contacts with the state involving in-state purchases and training trips); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 415, 445 (1952) (holding that an Ohio court could subject a Philippine mining corporation to personal jurisdiction even though the “cause of action sued upon did not arise in Ohio and d[id] not relate to the corporation’s activities there” because of the corporation’s substantial activities within the state, including “directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, [and] purchasing of machinery” ). In more recent years, the Court has significantly limited the types of activities or affiliations of the defendant in the forum state sufficient for general jurisdiction, holding that those contacts must be so substantial as to render the defendant “essentially at home” in the forum state.25 Footnote
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) ( “A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” ). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (holding that Daimler Chrysler, a German public stock company, could not be subject to suit in California with respect to acts taken in Argentina by an Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, notwithstanding the fact that Daimler Chrysler had a U.S. subsidiary that did business in California). The Court has clarified that, absent exceptional circumstances, a corporate defendant is “at home” when it is incorporated in the forum state or maintains its principal place of business there (e.g., the corporation is headquarted in the state).26 Footnote
Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 924 (noting an individual’s domicile and a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business as “paradigm” bases for general jurisdiction) (citation omitted); id. at 930 n.6 ( “[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.” ).

Although the Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible standard for evaluating a state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction, it has also confirmed that several traditional bases for the exercise of judicial power over a nonresident defendant for claims against him enjoy a presumption of constitutionality without requiring an independent inquiry into the contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. These traditional bases include: a defendant who is domiciled in the forum;27 Footnote
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940) ( “Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service . . . . The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties.” ); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (holding that the United States retains in personam jurisdiction over its citizens living abroad). A person’s “domicile” is generally the “place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . “Substituted service of process” refers to any “method of service allowed by law in place of personal service, such as service by mail.” Substituted Service, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . a defendant who has consented to jurisdiction;28 Footnote
“Consent” may be express or implied. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 318 (1964) (holding that defendant lessee’s contractual appointment of an agent to receive service of process on the lessee’s behalf amounted to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of New York when the agent was served with process and notified the lessee); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355–56 (1927) (upholding a state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on a theory of implied consent when the defendant drove a vehicle on a public highway in the state and was involved in an accident there). “Service of process” refers to the “formal delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal process, pleading, or notice to a litigant or other party interested in litigation; the legal communication of a judicial process.” Service, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . and a defendant who is a natural person (i.e., not a business or governmental entity) and is served with process while physically present within the forum.29 Footnote
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) ( “[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” ). Providing the fifth and deciding vote in Burnham , Justice White, in a concurring opinion, argued that a particular basis for jurisdiction could not be constitutionally valid merely because of its historical pedigree, and that fairness to the defendant must also be considered. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring). The Court has also indicated that a state court may adjudicate the personal status of a plaintiff in relation to the defendant (e.g., marital status) without considering whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant is constitutionally valid.30 Footnote
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) ( “[W]e do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident.” ), overruled in part by, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) .

Although the Supreme Court has decided several cases addressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction, it has generally declined to resolve questions about the extent to which the Fifth Amendment31 Footnote
U.S. Const. amend. V ( “[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ). may place similar jurisdictional limitations on federal courts. For example, the Supreme Court has declined to rule on whether it is constitutional for Congress to authorize nationwide service of process so that any federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who has, in the aggregate, substantial contacts with the United States.32 Footnote
Congress has provided for nationwide service of process in a handful of federal statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). But federal courts “ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) . This practice, which involves federal courts in analyzing the reach of a state’s long-arm statute and the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the court sits, stems from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (linking federal courts’ power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to service of process on the defendant according to the laws of the state in which the federal district court is located). See, e.g., Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 646–47 (5th Cir. 1994) ( “In a diversity suit, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that a state court in that forum has such jurisdiction. The reach of this jurisdiction is delimited by: (1) the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.” ) (citation omitted).Although the Supreme Court has decided several cases addressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction, it has generally declined to resolve questions about the extent to which the Fifth Amendment, see U.S. Const. amend. V ( “[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ), may place similar jurisdictional limitations on federal courts. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court , No. 16-466, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 19, 2017) ( “In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” ); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (declining to consider whether “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits” ); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 n. (1987) (plurality opinion) ( “We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.” ). As a result, the majority of this essay focus on the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the jurisdiction of state courts (and, through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts, as well). Consequently, this essay focuses on the Court’s cases addressing the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes due process requirements on actions by state governments.33 Footnote
U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ) (emphasis added). However, it is important to note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give federal district courts power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the same extent that a state court in the state where the federal district court is located may assert that power, meaning the same Fourteenth Amendment limits on personal jurisdiction generally apply to federal courts.34 Footnote
Supra note 32.

Footnotes 1 Personal Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014 ). back 2 In this context, “enforcement” of a judgment referred to a court’s action “to compel a person to comply with the terms of a judgment” of another state’s courts after determining that the foreign state’s judgment should be recognized as a judgment of the domestic court. Enforcement, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 3 Stephen E. Sachs , Pennoyer Was Right , 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 , 1270 (2017) ( “States that wanted to exercise broad jurisdiction would do so, and would execute judgments within their borders on as much of the defendant’s property as they could find. These state judgments, unlike foreign ones, could claim the benefit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 1790 Act. But these provisions were read to leave the law of personal jurisdiction alone. So when American courts were presented with the judgment of another tribunal, whether from Michigan or Mexico, they used the same approach to determining personal jurisdiction. The judgment was the product of a separate sovereign, which was expected to comply with international rules.” ). back 4 Id. at 1279 (noting that “federal courts did hear actions involving the recognition of other courts’ judgments, giving them opportunities to comment on the general rules” in diversity cases or cases raising questions under federal statutes regulating judicial procedure). See, e.g., Flower v. Parker , 9 F. Cas. 323, 324 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) ( No. 4891) (Story, C.J.) (evaluating a Massachusetts state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Louisiana defendant in a Massachusetts federal court case seeking the enforcement of the state court’s judgment). A “diversity case” is one in which a federal court exercises “authority over a case involving parties who are citizens of different states and an amount in controversy greater than a statutory minimum.” Diversity Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 5 “Customary law” refers to law “consisting of customs that are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.” Customary Law, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 6 Sachs, supra note 3, at 1270 ( “The Constitution’s role here was largely indirect—letting defendants remove their cases into federal court or challenge enforcement through diversity suits.” ). See also Hall v. Williams , 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232, 238 (1828) (stating that the “principles of the common law” applicable “to judgments of the tribunals of foreign countries” also applied “to the judgments of the courts of the several States when sought to be enforced by the judiciary power of any State other than that in which they were rendered” ). back 7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ). back 8 Although the bulk of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerns the constitutionality of courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants, the Court has addressed personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in at least one case. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (upholding a Kansas trial court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident class-action plaintiffs based on the mailing of an “opt-out notice” to the plaintiffs even though their contacts with the forum might not have been sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process had they been defendants in a lawsuit). back 9 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ( “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.” ) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ). “A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” Id. As discussed elsewhere in the Constitution Annotated, see supra Amdt5.4.5.4.7 Other Aspects of Due Process, the Due Process Clause also requires that a defendant receive adequate notice that a lawsuit has been brought against him and have the opportunity to respond. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950) ( “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” ). In addition to complying with the requirements of the Federal Constitution, state courts must also have authority under state law in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Oftentimes, states have enacted “long-arm” statutes that grant their courts jurisdiction over nonresidents. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 ( “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” ); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (specifying situations in which the exercise of jurisdiction comports with state law). back 10 Sachs, supra note 3, at 1253 ( “The Fourteenth Amendment remade this picture simply by changing the route for appeal. A judgment without jurisdiction was void; its execution took away property (or, less commonly, liberty) without due process of law. That turned the presence or absence of jurisdiction, full stop, into a matter of constitutional concern.” ). “Execution” of a judgment refers to judicial enforcement of a money judgment, often “by seizing and selling the judgment debtor’s property.” Execution, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 11 Sachs, supra note 3, at 1253. “Due process” generally refers to the “conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” Due Process, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 12 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court , No. 16-466, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 19, 2017) ( “As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’” ) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ); World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum “acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system” ); id. at 293 ( “The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.” ). back 13 World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum “protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum” ); Hanson , 357 U.S. at 251 (acknowledging that limits on personal jurisdiction are, in part, “a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation” ). The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of personal jurisdiction makes it easier for defendants to structure their conduct in a manner that will avoid subjecting them to lawsuits in a particular forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) . back 14 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011) (plurality opinion) ( “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful power. This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.” ) (internal citations omitted); Burger King , 471 U.S. at 471–72 ( “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982) (declaring that the restriction on state power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is “ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause” ). back 15 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) ( “As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome.” ). back 16 Id. back 17 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ( “The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum . . . [an] illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.” ), overruled in part by, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) . back 18 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ( “[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” ). back 19 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ( “[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist ‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum State.” ) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316 ); id. at 292 ( “[T]he defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316) ). See also Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 ( “So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” ). back 20 See discussion infra Amdt5.4.7.1.4 Minimum Contact Requirements for Personal Jurisdiction. back 21 See Edward A. Hartnett , Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts , 59 SMU L. Rev. 1735 , 1755 (2006) (describing the “constitutionality of exercising personal jurisdiction” as “probably the most common constitutional question that courts decide” ). back 22 See Michael E. Solimine , The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction , 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1 , 23–38 (1998) (noting in a study of nearly 1,000 cases addressing the issue personal jurisdiction decided by state supreme courts and federal appeals courts between and 1970 and 1994, including 148 products liability cases, that personal jurisdiction was a successful defense in nearly 41% of the cases in which the defense was raised). back 23 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) ( “It has been said that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” ) (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman , Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis , 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 , 1144–64 (1966) ); Int’l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 317 ( “Presence in the state . . . has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on . . . .” ) (internal quotation marks omitted). back 24 See Helicopteros , 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 ( “When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” ); see also id. at 416 (holding that a Texas court could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that did not have a place of business in Texas and had only limited contacts with the state involving in-state purchases and training trips); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 415, 445 (1952) (holding that an Ohio court could subject a Philippine mining corporation to personal jurisdiction even though the “cause of action sued upon did not arise in Ohio and d[id] not relate to the corporation’s activities there” because of the corporation’s substantial activities within the state, including “directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, [and] purchasing of machinery” ). back 25 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) ( “A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” ). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (holding that Daimler Chrysler, a German public stock company, could not be subject to suit in California with respect to acts taken in Argentina by an Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, notwithstanding the fact that Daimler Chrysler had a U.S. subsidiary that did business in California). back 26 Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 924 (noting an individual’s domicile and a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business as “paradigm” bases for general jurisdiction) (citation omitted); id. at 930 n.6 ( “[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.” ). back 27 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940) ( “Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service . . . . The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties.” ); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (holding that the United States retains in personam jurisdiction over its citizens living abroad). A person’s “domicile” is generally the “place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . “Substituted service of process” refers to any “method of service allowed by law in place of personal service, such as service by mail.” Substituted Service, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 28 “Consent” may be express or implied. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 318 (1964) (holding that defendant lessee’s contractual appointment of an agent to receive service of process on the lessee’s behalf amounted to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of New York when the agent was served with process and notified the lessee); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355–56 (1927) (upholding a state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on a theory of implied consent when the defendant drove a vehicle on a public highway in the state and was involved in an accident there). “Service of process” refers to the “formal delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal process, pleading, or notice to a litigant or other party interested in litigation; the legal communication of a judicial process.” Service, Black’s Law Dictionary , supra note 1 . back 29 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) ( “[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” ). Providing the fifth and deciding vote in Burnham , Justice White, in a concurring opinion, argued that a particular basis for jurisdiction could not be constitutionally valid merely because of its historical pedigree, and that fairness to the defendant must also be considered. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring). back 30 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) ( “[W]e do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident.” ), overruled in part by, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) . back 31 U.S. Const. amend. V ( “[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ). back 32 Congress has provided for nationwide service of process in a handful of federal statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). But federal courts “ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) . This practice, which involves federal courts in analyzing the reach of a state’s long-arm statute and the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the court sits, stems from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (linking federal courts’ power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to service of process on the defendant according to the laws of the state in which the federal district court is located). See, e.g., Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 646–47 (5th Cir. 1994) ( “In a diversity suit, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that a state court in that forum has such jurisdiction. The reach of this jurisdiction is delimited by: (1) the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.” ) (citation omitted).

back 33 U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” ) (emphasis added). back 34 Supra note 32. back